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Outsourcing and trade in a spatial world
Abstract
This paper provides an analysis of outsourcing and trade in a spatial model à la Hotelling. In this setting,
we discuss the trade-off between transport-cost-related disadvantages and outsourcing-related
production cost advantages of a large economy and we investigate how the existence of national
transport costs influences both the structure of industrial production and the pattern of final goods trade.
In addition, the model gives a rich picture of the possible welfare effects of trade liberalization. In
particular, we show that a final goods exporting country definitely gains from economic integration,
while a final goods importing country may lose. Finally, when lowering domestic outsourcing activities,
trade liberalization may reduce world welfare, even if pro-competitive effects lead to a decline in
consumer prices.
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Abstract
This paper provides an analysis of outsourcing and trade in a spatial model a`
la Hotelling. In this setting, we discuss the trade-off between transport-cost-related
disadvantages and outsourcing-related production cost advantages of a large econ-
omy and we investigate how the existence of national transport costs influences
both the structure of industrial production and the pattern of final goods trade.
In addition, the model gives a rich picture of the possible welfare effects of trade
liberalization. In particular, we show that a final goods exporting country definitely
gains from economic integration, while a final goods importing country may lose.
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duce world welfare, even if pro-competitive effects lead to a decline in consumer
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1 Introduction
Trade theory has treated countries as points in space for a long time. By elaborating on
the role of distance (or, more generally, transport costs) between two trading partners,
existing models typically ignore geographical aspects of the involved countries and do not
account for the location of producers and consumers within a particular economy. Such
an approach may be justified if trade of two remote partners (e.g., the US and Japan)
is the matter of interest, but it is less appropriate if transactions between two adjacent
countries (such as the US and Canada) are considered. Then, intranational transport
costs of the exporting and the importing country account for the lion’s share of overall
shipment costs, rendering the location of economic activity within two adjacent countries
an important determinant of their trade.
In recent years, economists have become increasingly interested in how geographical
aspects influence trade patterns and the welfare effects of economic integration. Tharakan
and Thisse [18] associate countries with segments of a line and use a Hotelling framework
to enrich the trade literature with insights from location theory. There, consumers are
dispersed in space and the trade pattern crucially depends on the distance of the pro-
duction sites in two adjacent economies from the common border. By focusing on final
goods trade and assuming that consumers are uniformly distributed along the line, while
production is concentrated in the center of economies, Tharakan and Thisse identify a
transport-cost-related size disadvantage and show that small countries gain while large
countries lose from trade liberalization.
While this paper builds on Tharakan and Thisse [18], it puts the endogenous choice
between an integrated production of final and intermediate goods versus outsourcing of
the latter at the center of interest. As in previous research on vertical integration, the
specialization on the intermediate and final production stages at the firm level is associ-
ated with lower marginal production costs. At the same time, setting up an intermediate
goods production facility induces fixed start-up costs. As a consequence, input produc-
ers have an incentive to enter only if the market and thus their operating profits are
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sufficiently high. Otherwise, they stay out and save on investment costs. If consumers
are uniformly distributed, larger countries may therefore benefit from a higher degree of
vertical specialization (relative to their smaller trading partners).1 This counteracts their
transport-cost-related size disadvantage identified in Tharakan and Thisse [18].
Studying this trade-off of being large and its consequences for the pattern of trade and
the welfare effects of economic integration is at the heart of this paper’s interest. The
remainder of the paper is organized as follows. After a short discussion of the relationship
between previous research and our analysis, Section 3 sets up the basic framework of out-
sourcing in a spatial model a` la Hotelling. The determination of the autarky equilibrium
is at the agenda in Section 4. There, we derive formal conditions on country size and tech-
nology for the incentives of intermediate goods producers to enter the market. Section 5
studies trade liberalization between two asymmetrically sized economies and investigates
the price-setting behavior of final and intermediate goods producers. Furthermore, it
provides a characterization of the trade pattern as a function of national transport costs.
The focus lies on a short-run perspective for given entry/exit and location decisions.2
The respective welfare effects of trade liberalization are addressed in Section 6. Section 7
concludes with a brief summary of the most important results.
2 Relationship to previous research
The basic idea to use a spatial model a` la Hotelling for studying trade liberalization
between two adjacent economies goes back to Shachmurove and Spiegel [16]. However,
the equilibrium analyzed there does not exist, due to the assumption of linear transport
costs (cf. Tharakan [17]). Tharakan and Thisse [18] overcome this problem by considering
1There are other factors, like economies of scale, that may provide an advantage to a large economy.
In this paper, however, we ignore other channels through which country size may have a beneficial effect
and focus on the role of local outsourcing opportunities.
2In an earlier version of this paper, we have also accounted for adjustments in the entry/exit and
location decisions of input producers to shed light on the long-run implications of trade liberalization.
However, in the interests of space and readability we have decided to eliminate this discussion and to
refer the interested reader to the working paper version of our manuscript in Egger and Egger [6].
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quadratic transport costs in a model with final goods only. We use such a Hotelling
framework with quadratic transport costs and account for a firm’s decision to produce
in-house versus purchasing intermediate goods from an outside supplier. Thereby, we
associate greater country size with superior local outsourcing opportunities. The primary
goal is to analyze the impact of outsourcing on both the pattern of final goods trade
and the welfare effects of economic integration in a spatial model with national transport
costs.
Treating a firm’s boundaries as endogenous relates this paper to previous research
on outsourcing which we contribute to in three ways. First, we provide a model in
which national (Burda and Dluhosch [4]) and international outsourcing (Kohler [10]) can
simultaneously occur. While there is now a broad consensus among economists that both
types of outsourcing are important features of the recent wave of globalization, existing
models typically consider only one of the two modes of intermediate goods transactions.3
Second, we show how national transport costs affect the price choice of intermediate
goods suppliers and thus the final goods producers’ incentives for outsourcing part of
their production to a specialized input supplier.4 Third, we discuss how geographical
distance and outsourcing opportunities interact in explaining the pattern of trade and the
welfare effects of economic integration.
Finally, by accounting for both final and intermediate goods transactions, our analysis
is also related to the spatial model of trade by Rossi-Hansberg [15]. The most important
differences between his analysis and ours are the following. First, he focuses on a trade-off
between agglomerative forces (through production externalities) and congestion (through
extra costs of exporting production and importing intermediates as well as the scarcity
3Two notable exceptions are Antra`s and Helpman [2] and Grossman and Helpman [7] who analyze
local and global sourcing in a general equilibrium North-South model. Yet in contrast to their approach,
we use a partial equilibrium setting of two economies, which differ only in size but not in other economic
fundamentals.
4This relates our paper to a recent contribution by Helsley and Strange [9] who study the choice
between integrated production and outsourcing as well as the locational decision of input producers in
a uniform framework. In contrast to our study, however, they do not provide insights into the role of
national transport costs for international outsourcing in a two-country setting.
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of land) while we determine the interaction between two aspects of country size, namely
the number of consumers and geographical distance. Second he considers outsourcing as
given while the modeling of the endogenous choice between integration and outsourcing is
at the heart of our paper’s interest. Third, we base our analysis on a Hotelling framework
while he does not.
3 Basic model set up
Consider a linear model a` la Hotelling with one final goods producer located at the center
of a country with extension (length) l, i.e., at l/2. In the following, we use the notion
“country l” for such an economy. The location of the final goods producer is fixed.5
Population in country l is uniformly distributed along the line [0, l] with one consumer
located at each address b ∈ [0, l]. As in Tharakan and Thisse [18], l refers to both the
geographical size of the country and the mass of its population. Each consumer buys
at most one unit of the final good. “Disutility” from a larger distance of consumers to
the final goods producer is represented by quadratic transport costs.6 The maximum
acceptable price for the final good depends on the willingness to pay (A) and the location
of a consumer along the line (b). It is given by A − (b− l/2)2, where l/2 is the position
of the final goods producer.
As pointed out before, the contribution of this study is to allow for two different
production technologies in a spatial model of trade. First, as in Shachmurove and Spiegel
[16] and Tharakan and Thisse [18], there is an integrated production mode, where the
5Our assumption on the location of the final goods producer follows Tharakan and Thisse [18], who
remark that “[t]his location allows each firm to maximize its profit in autarky and is chosen once-and-
for-all because firms show a strong spatial inertia” (p. 385). For the purpose of notational simplicity, we
do not explicitly consider set-up costs of final goods producers. Hence, profits of final goods suppliers are
equivalent to their operating profits.
6The assumption of quadratic transport costs is not important for the autarky situation. However,
this assumption will be crucial for the existence of a Nash-equilibrium in prices under free trade. See the
discussion in Footnote 20, below. There is an extensive literature on the existence of price equilibria in
linear models of spatial competition (see among others d’Aspremont et al. [5]; Anderson [1]; and Osborne
and Pitchik [14]). Hamoudi and Moral [8] investigate the existence under concave and convex transport
costs. For the purpose of simplicity, we stick to the textbook case of quadratic transport costs.
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whole production process takes place in-house. Second, the final goods producer may
fragment the production process and engage in outsourcing by purchasing intermediate
inputs from an external supplier at arm’s length.
We assume that integrated production (index i) exhibits constant marginal costs ci,
with A > ci > 0. In the case of outsourcing, the final goods producer – who is now
a downstream producer (index d) – uses one unit of a component, purchased from an
upstream input supplier (index u), to manufacture one unit of final output. There are
no costs of final assembling and the specialized input supplier can manufacture the inter-
mediate good at a lower cost than the final goods producer: cu < ci. Before production
can be started, an input producer has to invest fixed costs in the amount of f to set up a
production facility (at a certain point along the line). If the input producer does not stay
at l/2, there are quadratic transport costs for shipping the component to the final goods
producer. Transport costs per unit of the intermediate good are given by t (l/2− xu)2,
where xu ∈ [0, l] is the location of the input supplier and l/2 the location of the final
goods producer. Intermediate inputs and final output are two different types of goods so
that the transport technologies for shipping intermediate and final output may also be
different. This is reflected by parameter t, which may differ from one, in general. Produc-
tion costs in the downstream process depend on the price charged by the specialized input
producer, ρ, and the transport costs for shipping the intermediate good, t (l/2− xu)2.7
They are given by, ρd := ρ+ t (l/2− xu)2. If there is no input producer who supplies the
required fragment, the final goods producer does not have access to outsourcing and is,
7By assuming that the input producer sets the price for the intermediate good, we abstract from the
hold-up problem that may otherwise govern the bilateral relationship between the seller and the buyer
of an intermediate good, due to the fixed cost investment of the input producer. This is an important
difference to McLaren [13], who investigates the impact of international openness on vertical integration
in a setting, in which the input producer is in danger of being held up by the downstream final goods
producer. To address the hold-up problem, we have considered an alternative price-setting mechanism
in a previous version of this manuscript. There, we have assumed that a contract on the fixed cost
investment of the input producer is not possible (as this investment is not verifiable to outside parties)
and we have investigated Nash bargaining as an alternative input price determination process. It turns
out that such a modification renders the analysis more complicated without affecting the main results
qualitatively. For a detailed discussion on the issue of Nash bargaining on input prices, see the working
paper version of our manuscript in Egger and Egger [6].
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therefore, tied to the integrated production mode.
4 Autarky equilibrium
There is a sequence of five decisions that determines the autarky equilibrium: (i) A single
input producer decides upon entry and location. (ii) After entry, the input producer sets
a price ρ vis-a`-vis the final goods supplier (a monopolist in the final goods market). (iii)
Based on that price, the transport costs for input transactions and marginal production
costs ci, the final goods producer chooses between in-house supply of the input (integra-
tion) and purchases from outside the firm (outsourcing). (iv) The final goods producer
finishes the product and sets the mill price for the final good.8 (v) Consumers make their
purchases. See Figure 1 for a summary of these decisions.
>Figure 1<
The autarky equilibrium can be derived through backward induction.
Stage (v) - Consumption: A consumer located at address b has positive demand if
A ≥ p(b) := p + (b− l/2)2, where p(b) denotes the consumer price, p is the final good’s
mill price and b − l/2 measures the distance between the respective consumer and the
final goods producer (who, by assumption, is located at the center of the local market at
address l/2). Since any consumer purchases at most one unit of final output, aggregate
final goods demand is given by
D =

l
2
√
A− p
0
if
if
if
p ∈ [0, A− l2/4]
p ∈ (A− l2/4, A)
p ≥ A
. (1)
8We assume “mill pricing” in the context of final goods transactions since final goods producers face a
large number of consumers. In contrast, we will allow for (spatial) price discrimination of input producers
under free trade as the number of final goods suppliers is small. Indeed, setting a uniform mill price would
not be an optimal strategy, if final goods producers can easily be identified/distinguished by the input
supplier.
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At a mill price not higher than A − l2/4, even consumers at the two borders with the
largest distance to the firm in the market center, would like to buy the final good. We
refer to this case as one of full coverage (of consumers) in the subsequent analysis. On the
contrary, if the final goods producer sets a mill price which is higher than A− l2/4, only
consumers that are close enough to the center of country l will buy the final good. We
refer to this case as one of partial coverage (of consumers), below. Aggregate demand is
given by 2
√
A− p in this case. Finally, if p ≥ A even consumers with the same address as
the final goods supplier lose their interest in consumption, so that aggregate demand for
the final good falls to zero. Since this case becomes irrelevant if the consumers’ willingness
to pay is sufficiently high (i.e., A > ci), we can safely ignore an outcome with p > A in
the sequel.
Stage (iv) - Price setting of the final goods producer: The final goods producer
sets the profit-maximizing mill price by accounting for (1). Refraining from outcomes
with p > A, we need to distinguish between full coverage with D = l if p ≤ A − l2/4
and partial coverage with D ∈ (0, l) if p ∈ (A − l2/4, A). In addition, there are two
production modes: (a) in-house production of intermediate goods or (b) outsourcing of
input production to an external supplier.
If the single final goods producer located at the center of market l manufactures the
input in-house (index i), profits are given by
pi (pi) =
 2 (pi − ci)
√
A− pi
(pi − ci) l
if
if
pi ∈ (A− l2/4, A]
pi ∈ [0, A− l2/4]
, (2)
where the first line represents profits under partial coverage and the second line becomes
relevant if there is full coverage, according to (1). Parameter ci indicates the marginal
costs of in-house production. By maximizing profits (2), the final goods producer sets
pi =
 2A+ci3A− l2/4 ifif A < ci + 3l
2/4
A ≥ ci + 3l2/4
. (3)
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Comparing the two lines in (3), we see that, all other things equal, the profit-maximizing
price under partial coverage is higher than the respective price under full coverage.9 This
indicates a well-known trade-off in the price-setting process. A higher price raises profits
for a given level of output but, at the same time, reduces the volume of sales with adverse
effects on profits.10
Equations (2) and (3) have been derived under the assumption that the final goods
producer manufactures the intermediate good in-house. In a next step, we determine
profits and the profit-maximizing mill price for a scenario with outsourcing and purchases
of the intermediate good from an external supplier. Under outsourcing, profits of the
downstream firm are given by
pi (pd) =
 2
(
pd − ρd
)√
A− pd(
pd − ρd
)
l
if
if
pd ∈ (A− l2/4, A]
pd ∈ [0, A− l2/4]
, (4)
where ρd = ρ + t (l/2− xu)2 is the transport-cost-including price of the intermediate
good. It depends on input price ρ, and on transport costs t(l/2 − xu)2 for shipping the
intermediate good from the upstream producer (located at address xu) to the downstream
producer (located at address l/2). Hence, if the two producers are dispersed in space, the
costs of final goods production differ from the price charged by the input producer: ρd > ρ
if xu 6= l/2. Maximizing profits (4) gives
pd =

2A+ρd
3
A− l2/4
if
if
A < ρd + 3l2/4
A ≥ ρd + 3l2/4
. (5)
Again, we find that, all other things equal, the final goods producer sets a higher price
under partial coverage than under full coverage.
Stage (iii) - Outsourcing decision: With the results from stage (iv) at hand, we can
9From (3), it is immediate that pi is continuous in A and ci. Furthermore, substituting the profit-
maximizing price pi into profit function pi(pi), it follows from (2) that (maximum) profits are also con-
tinuous in A and ci.
10Of course, lowering pi below A− l2/4 cannot be an optimal strategy for the final goods producer, as
there is already full coverage at pi = A− l2/4.
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now turn to the outsourcing decision of the final goods producer. Substituting (3) and
(5) for the two mill prices in (2) and (4), we obtain
pi∗i =
 4
(
A−ci
3
)3/2
(A− l2/4− ci) l
if
if
A < ci + 3l
2/4
A ≥ ci + 3l2/4
(6)
and
pi∗d =
 4
(
A−ρd
3
)3/2
(
A− l2/4− ρd) l
if
if
A < ρd + 3l2/4
A ≥ ρd + 3l2/4
. (7)
From (6) and (7) it follows immediately that the outsourcing decision depends on the
ranking of ci >,=, < ρ
d. If the cost of in-house production is lower than the respective
cost under outsourcing, i.e., if ci < ρ
d = ρ+ t (l/2− xu)2, the final goods producer prefers
the integrated technology. On the contrary, if the cost of purchasing the intermediate
good from an outside supplier is lower (not higher) than the respective cost under in-
house production, i.e., if ci ≥ ρd = ρ + t (l/2− xu)2, the final goods producer prefers
outsourcing. (Of course, outsourcing is only possible, if a specialized input producer has
entered the market.)
So far, our analysis has accounted for partial as well as full coverage of consumers.
From now on, however, we focus on a parameter domain that guarantees full coverage
under autarky, so that all consumers buy one unit of final output, irrespective of whether
outsourcing or integrated production is chosen by the final goods producer. This improves
the exposition of our analysis and renders the results in our paper directly comparable
to those of Tharakan and Thisse [18], who impose a similar assumption. A sufficient
condition for full coverage in the autarky equilibrium is given by Assumption 1.
Assumption 1 A > ci + 3l
2/4.
Consider integrated production first. By virtue of (3), it follows that the profit-
maximizing price of the final goods producer is given by pi = A − l2/4 if condition
A > ci+3l
2/4 holds. In this case, full coverage (i.e., D = l) is guaranteed by (1). Second,
note that outsourcing is chosen if and only if in-house production of intermediate goods is
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more costly than purchases from an external supplier: ci ≥ ρd. Hence, it follows from (1)
and (5) that condition A > ci+3l
2/4 is also sufficient for full coverage under outsourcing.
Stage (ii) - Price setting of the input producer: If the input producer has entered
and settled at address xu ∈ [0, l], it follows from the analysis of stage (iii) that her
operating profits are given by
χ (ρ) =
 (ρ− cu) l0 ifif ρ ≤ ci − t (l/2− xu)
2
ρ > ci − t (l/2− xu)2
, (8)
where ρ denotes the input price and cu are marginal production costs of the specialized
input producer. There are two possible outcomes. If the input producer sets a price such
that ρd = ρ+t(l/2−xu)2 ≤ ci, the final goods producer decides for outsourcing and serves
all domestic consumers (according to Assumption 1). On the contrary, if the transport-
cost-including input price is higher than the cost of in-house production, i.e., if ρd > ci, the
final goods producer prefers the integrated technology. In this case, output and operating
profits of the input producer fall to zero. According to (8), there is a cost advantage of
outsourcing as compared to integrated production if cu ≤ ci − t (l/2− xu)2. Then, the
profit-maximizing input price is11 ρ = ci− t (l/2− xu)2 and the achieved operating profits
are
χ∗ =
[
ci − t (l/2− xu)2 − cu
]
l. (9)
Lowering the input price below ci − t (l/2− xu)2 cannot be beneficial, since the input
producer already serves the whole domestic market at a price ρ = ci − t (l/2− xu)2. Put
differently, cu ≤ ci − t (l/2− xu)2 implies that the specialized input producer (if entered
at stage (i)) will set a price, which renders the final goods supplier indifferent between
integrated production and outsourcing. In this case, the input producer skims the whole
specialization rent.
Stage (i) - Entry decision and location choice of the input producer: The input
11Note that ρ = ci − t (l/2− xu)2 implies ρd = ci.
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producer enters and settles down at the profit-maximizing location xu = l/2, if there is a
prospect of non-negative profits, i.e., if operating profits χ(ρ) are higher (not lower) than
the fixed entry costs f . Accounting for cu < ci, it follows from (8) and (9) that this is the
case if the domestic market is sufficiently large, i.e., if l ≥ f/ (ci − cu). On the contrary,
if the domestic market is small relative to the fixed set-up costs, i.e., if l < f/ (ci − cu),
entry is unattractive for the input producer and only the integrated technology is available
to the final goods producer. This implies that the entry decision of the input producer is
efficient.12
The main findings of the backward induction are summarized in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 Under Assumption 1, the following holds in the autarky equilibrium:
(a) If l ≥ f/ (ci − cu), the input producer enters and settles at the center of market l,
i.e., at location xu = l/2. Then, ρ = ci and pd = A − l2/4 are profit-maximizing input
and final goods prices, respectively, and operating profits are given by χ∗ = (ci − cu) l and
pi∗d = (A− l2/4− ci) l.
(b) If l < f/ (ci − cu), the input producer does not enter so that integrated production pre-
vails. In this case, pi = A−l2/4 is the relevant final goods price and pi∗i = (A− l2/4− ci) l
are the corresponding profits.
Proof. Proposition 1 follows from the backward induction above.
In the following analysis, we consider two asymmetrically sized economies: a small
one of size s = 1 and a large one of size L > 1. The two countries are adjacent and, due
to their size asymmetry, they may differ with respect to the existence of a local input
supplier under autarky (see Proposition 1). In all other respects the two economies are
identical and Assumption 1 holds for both countries, so that there is full coverage in
12One remark is in order here. The autarky results do not depend on our assumption of a single
potential entrant in the intermediate goods market. If a second input producer entered, then both
competitors would have an incentive to settle down at the same address as the final goods producer. In
this case, price competition would lead to ρ = cu and both input producers would make negative profits
and, therefore, benefit from leaving the market to save on the fixed set-up costs. Hence, our assumption
of a single potential entrant into the intermediate goods market is not as restrictive as it might seem at
a first glance.
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either economy. Figure 2 illustrates the autarky equilibrium in the two differently sized
economies. According to Proposition 1, the final goods producer in country s sets a higher
mill price than her counterpart in country L: pas = A − 1/4 > paL = A − L2/4, where
superscript a refers to autarky. Serving the whole market implies higher transport costs
and, thus, for a given willingness to pay A, a lower mill price in country L. This result
clearly depends on Assumption 1 but it is independent of which production techniques
are used in the two economies.
>Figure 2<
With respect to the mode of final goods production in the two asymmetrically sized
countries, we can distinguish three cases according to Proposition 1: (1) one with no
specialized input producer active in countries s and L, i.e., only the integrated production
mode is available for the two final goods suppliers; (2) one with outsourcing in the large
economy, but integrated production in country s; and (3) one with a specialized input
producer in either economy so that both final goods producers outsource intermediate
goods production to an external input supplier in their domestic market.
In the next section, we analyze prices and the trade pattern in the free trade equilib-
rium. Thereby, we assume that location and entry/exit decisions of firms are given (and
inherited from the autarky equilibrium).13 Furthermore, due to the restriction of space
and motivated by the empirical stylized fact that national outsourcing is more pronounced
in larger economies,14 we focus on case (2) and assume that there is a single input pro-
ducer active in the large economy, while autarky production is integrated in country s.
Formally, we consider a parameter domain with s = 1 < f/ (ci − cu) ≤ L.15
13By ignoring the impact of trade liberalization on entry/exit and location decisions, we take a short-
run perspective. As mentioned earlier, the respective long-run effects can be found in the working paper
version of our manuscript in Egger and Egger [6].
14Using data for 1995 on purchases of intermediate goods and services in percent of gross production
from EUROSTAT (Input-Output Tables) as a measure of national outsourcing, we find that national
outsourcing of EU15 countries is positively associated with population size with a correlation coefficient
of 0.54.
15For a discussion on cases (1) and (3) we refer the interested reader to the working paper version of
our manuscript in Egger and Egger [6].
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5 The free trade equilibrium
To analyze the impact of trade liberalization, we follow the common approach and assume
that tariffs on final as well as intermediate goods trade between (the two adjacent) coun-
tries s and L fall from infinity to zero. Free trade means that consumers have the choice
to purchase the final good from either seller (i.e., from the one located at the center of
country s or the one located at the center of country L), but must bear the correspond-
ing quadratic transport costs. This implies that under free trade some consumers may
purchase the final good abroad. Hence, there is cross-country competition of final goods
producers instead of the monopoly under autarky. This may but does not necessarily
result in lower final goods prices as has been shown by Tharakan and Thisse [18]. In
addition, final goods producers may purchase the component from abroad, if the input
producer is active there.
Taking the autarky decision at stage (i) as given, we focus on the stage (ii)-(v) free
trade equilibrium in this section. Again, we solve the equilibrium through backward
induction, starting with an analysis of stage (v).
Stage (v) - Consumption: Since there are now two competitors in the final goods
market, it is useful to characterize the marginal consumer. The marginal consumer is
indifferent between the two final goods suppliers or, if all consumers prefer purchasing
the final good from the supplier in country s (L), it is the consumer located at the right
(left) border of the integrated market.16 For given final goods prices ps, pL, the marginal
consumer is located in interval [0, L+ 1] and her address is determined by
xm (ps, pL) =

0
pL−ps
L+1
+ L+3
4
L+ 1
if
if
if
pL − ps < − (L+3)(L+1)4
(pL − ps) ∈
[
− (L+3)(L+1)
4
, (3L+1)(L+1)
4
]
pL − ps > (3L+1)(L+1)4
. (10)
If the mill price of the final goods producer in country L is sufficiently small compared
to the respective price of her competitor, all consumers prefer the final good from the
16Note that a consumer at address b prefers the final good produced in country s if ps + (b− 1/2)2 <
pL + [b− (1 + L/2)]2.
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supplier in the large economy and the marginal consumer is located at address xm = 0,
i.e., at the remote border from the perspective of the final goods producer in country L.
In this case, demand for country s production falls to zero. On the contrary, if the final
goods producer in country L sets a particularly high mill price relative to her competitor
in the small economy, the marginal consumer will be located at address xm = L+ 1 and
demand for final goods from country L falls to zero. Finally, if the price differential is not
too high, the marginal consumer will be located in the interior of the integrated market,
at some address xm ∈ (0, L+ 1).
Knowing the location of the marginal consumer, however, is not sufficient for a char-
acterization of consumer demand. The reason is that we cannot rule out in general that
there is partial coverage of consumers under free trade, although Assumption 1 guar-
antees full coverage under autarky. Under partial coverage, the willingness to pay, A,
becomes a relevant criterion in the determination of consumer demand. Abstracting from
the possbility of pk > A, k = s, L, we can introduce the following four variables:
v :=
1
2
+
√
A− ps, w := 1
2
−
√
A− ps, (11)
y := 1 +
L
2
+
√
A− pL, z := 1 + L
2
−
√
A− pL, (12)
with b = v, b = w being implicitly determined by A = ps + (b − 1/2)2 and b = y, b = z
being implicitly determined by A = pL + [b − (1 + L/2)]2. Then, max(0, w) gives a left
bound for consumers of country s production. If 0 > w, the willingness to pay of all
consumers in the hinterland17 of country s exceeds the transport-cost-including price for
purchases of country s production. If, on the contrary, w > 0, consumers in interval [0, w)
lose the incentive to purchase the final good from the producer in the small economy, as
their willingness to pay, A, is lower than the transport-cost-including price, ps+(b−1/2)2.
Furthermore, min(v, xm) determines a right bound for consumers of country s production.
If xm < v, the location of the marginal consumer, who – in the case of an interior solution
– is indifferent between buying the final good from the supplier in the large or the supplier
17The hinterland of country s is given by the line segment between 0 and 1/2, while the line segment
between 1 + L/2 and L+ 1 determines the hinterland of country L.
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in the small economy, constrains demand from the perspective of the country s producer.
If, on the contrary, v < xm, then address v > 1/2 becomes the relevant constraint,
as the transport-cost-including price of country s production exceeds the willingness to
pay of consumers with address b > v. The respective bounds for consumers of country
L production are given by min(L + 1, y) and max(z, xm), with y and z having similar
interpretations as v and w.
One further remark is in order here. At this stage of our analysis, we cannot rule out
that either z < w or v > y holds. In this case, we have a corner solution either with
zero demand for country s production (if z < w) or with zero demand for country L
production (if v > y). With these insights at hand, we can now characterize consumer
demand for final goods production in the two economies:
Ds =
 [min (v, xm)−max (0, w)] if z ≥ w0 otherwise , (13)
DL =
 [min (L+ 1, y)−max (z, xm)] if v ≤ y0 otherwise , (14)
with Ds, DL denoting demand for country s production and country L production, re-
spectively. Eqs. (13) and (14) include the outcomes with full and partial coverage as well
as interior solutions (with Ds > 0, DL > 0) and corner solutions (with Ds = 0 or DL = 0)
as special cases. The first lines of these equations coincide with the respective expressions
in Tharakan and Thisse [18]. For an interpretation of the demand system in (13) and (14),
let us abstract from the possibility of corner solutions. Then, w ≤ 0 implies v ≥ 1 and,
thus, full coverage of country s consumers, according to (11). If, in addition, y ≥ L + 1
and thus z ≤ 1, there is also full coverage of country L consumers, according to (12).
An outcome with full coverage of consumers in both economies is similar to the autarky
equilibrium. However, consumers can purchase the final good from either supplier after
trade liberalization, so that demand is no longer symmetric around the center of the local
market if xm 6= 1. This renders the location of the marginal consumer a key element of
the subsequent analysis.
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Partial coverage of consumers requires either w > 0 (and thus v < 1) or y < L+1 (and
thus z > 1). By virtue of Proposition 1 and the formal analysis in Section 4, this implies
that partial coverage becomes an issue only if trade liberalization leads to an increase
in the price charged by at least one of the two final goods producers. To illustrate the
possibility of partial coverage, consider for example a scenario with 1/2 < xm < v. Then,
w > 0 (and, thus, v < 1) implies that part of the consumers to the left of the final goods
supplier in country s do not purchase a final good. However, xm < v < 1 is sufficient for
z < 1 and, by virtue of (12), also sufficient for y > L+ 1. Hence, there is full coverage of
consumers in the large economy, according to (14). With the demand system in eqs. (13)
and (14) at hand, we can now proceed to stage (iv) of our analysis.
Stage (iv) - Price setting of the two final goods producers: Let ρk, k = s, L, be
the price net of transport costs of an intermediate good sold to the final goods producer
in country k. If ρL 6= ρs, there is spatial price discrimination by the input producer.
Moreover, in the case of outsourcing let ρk,d be the transport-cost-including input price
paid by the final goods producer located at the center of country k = s, L. Given the
autarky location of the input producer in country L, we obtain ρL,d = ρL and ρs,d =
ρs + t (L+ 1)2 /4, where (L+ 1) /2 is the distance between the final goods producer in s
and the input supplier in L (see Figure 2).
Since we account for two different modes of final goods production, namely in-house
manufacture and purchases of intermediate goods from an external supplier at arm’s
length, it is meaningful to introduce a new variable ck, which allows us to address the
cost of final goods production in country k = s, L without any reference to the particular
technology in use in the final goods sector. To be more specific, in the following we use
the variable ck ∈ {ci, ρk,d}, k = s, L, with ck = ci, if the final goods producer in country
k chooses the integrated production mode, while ck = ρk,d, if the final goods producer
engages in outsourcing. Using this notation, it follows from (13) and (14) that free trade
profits of the final goods producers in s and L are given by
pis = (ps − cs)Ds (15)
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and
piL =
(
pL − cL
)
DL, (16)
respectively.
For the case of integrated production in both economies, Tharakan and Thisse [18]
identify four parameter domains, which determine the set of possible price equilibria. It
is beyond the scope of this paper to provide a rigorous analysis of all possible parameter
domains. Therefore, we introduce a further empirically plausible assumption, namely
that trade liberalization has a pro-competitive effect (cf. Levinsohn [11]) and, by virtue
of Assumption 1, leads to full coverage under free trade. Taking into account that ck ≤ ci
must hold (see stage (iii) below), a sufficient condition for such an outcome is given by
Assumption 2.18
Assumption 2 A > ci + L(5L+ 4)/4.
Lemma 1 Under Assumption 2, for all ck ≤ ci, k = s, L, the following holds in a free
trade equilibrium. First, demand for final goods produced at the two locations is given by
Ds = xm (ps, pL) and DL = L+ 1− xm (ps, pL), respectively. Hence, there is full coverage
in the free trade equilibrium with each consumer buying one unit of final output, i.e.,
Ds +DL = L+ 1. Second, profits of the two final goods producers are given by
pis = (ps − cs)xm (ps, pL) , (17)
piL =
(
pL − cL
)
(L+ 1− xm (ps, pL)) , (18)
respectively.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Focusing on a parameter domain that guarantees full coverage under autarky as well
as under free trade means that the sales volume of the two final goods producers and thus
the final goods trade pattern are determined by the location of the marginal consumer. If
18Note that Assumption 2 implies Assumption 1 for both countries. Hence, there is full coverage under
autarky, if there is full coverage under free trade.
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she is resident of the small country, there are final goods exports of the large economy. On
the contrary, if she is resident of the large economy, it is the small country that exports
the final good.
Before we can determine the address of the marginal consumer, we need to search for
the profit-maximizing prices of the two final goods producers. To obtain a unique set
of equilibrium final goods prices, we impose a restriction on the price-setting behavior of
firms, namely pk ≥ ck, k = s, L.19 Then, maximizing profits (17) and (18) gives, according
to (10),
p∗s =

cs
cL+2cs
3
+ (5L+7)(L+1)
12
cL − (3L+1)(L+1)
4
if
if
if
cL ≤ cs − γ1(
cL − cs) ∈ (−γ1, γ2)
cL ≥ cs + γ2
(19)
and
p∗L =

cs − (L+3)(L+1)
4
2cL+cs
3
+ (7L+5)(L+1)
12
cL
if
if
if
cL ≤ cs − γ1(
cL − cs) ∈ (−γ1, γ2)
cL ≥ cs + γ2
(20)
where γ1 := (5L+ 7) (L+ 1) /4 and γ2 := (7L+ 5) (L+ 1) /4.
20 Note that p∗s < p
a
s =
A − 1/4 and p∗L < paL = A − L2/4 are a direct consequence of cs ≤ ci, cL ≤ ci (see stage
(iii) below) and Assumption 2.
A closer look on the role of production costs cs and cL for price-setting of the two final
goods producers seems to be worthwhile. Let us first consider a scenario with a positive
sales level of both final goods producers, 0 < xm < L + 1. Then, a lower cost of the
19It is shown in the proof of Appendix A that some pk < ck may be consistent with an equilibrium, if
there are zero sales of the final goods producer located in country k. Such price equilibria are ruled out
by the proposed assumption on the price-setting behavior of firms. For a logically similar problem in a
different context, see Ludema and Wooton [12].
20The existence of a price equilibrium (19) and (20) critically depends on the assumption of quadratic
transport costs. d’Aspremont et al. [5] show that a minimum distance between the locations of the two
final goods producers is essential for the existence of a Nash equilibrium in prices under linear transport
costs. However, as demonstrated in Tharakan [17], this “minimum distance condition” is not satisfied by
locations 1/2 and 1 + L/2 of the two final goods producers (and country sizes L > s = 1). Therefore,
a price equilibrium under linear transport costs is not consistent with our assumptions regarding the
locations of the two final goods producers (at least if marginal production costs of the two final goods
producers are identical, i.e., if cs = cL; see our discussion below).
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final goods producer in country L, i.e., a decline in cL for a given cs, makes this producer
more competitive and gives her an incentive to set a lower mill price p∗L. The lower mill
price induces a higher sales level, which comes at the cost of lower final goods sales by the
competitor in country s. The final goods producer in country s has therefore an incentive
to lower her mill price as well to defend her market shares. For a similar reason, a lower
cs leads to a decline in both mill prices and p∗s, p
∗
L turn out to be strategic complements.
From (19) and (20), we see that it is the direct effect of a cost reduction that dominates,
so that price differential p∗L − p∗s falls, if either cL declines or cs increases. By virtue of
(10), this means that for a sufficiently large cost differential, a corner solution is reached.
To be more specific, if cL − cs approaches −γ1, the price of the final goods producer
in country s approaches cs. Since firms cannot benefit from setting a price lower than
their marginal production costs, cL ≤ cs − γ1 implies that the final goods producer in
country s is no longer competitive and the final goods producer in country L can serve
the whole integrated market by setting p∗L = c
s − (L + 3)(L + 1)/4. On the contrary, if
cL ≥ cs+ γ2, the final goods producer in country L ceases to be competitive and the final
goods producer in country s can serve all consumers in the integrated market by setting
p∗s = c
L − (3L + 1)(L + 1)/4. The two critical levels γ1 and γ2 differ in size, because,
with final goods producers located at the center of their domestic markets, our model
generates a spatial asymmetry: The distance to the remote border is larger for the final
goods producer in the small economy than for her counterpart in the large economy. As a
consequence, the critical cost differential γ2 is larger than the respective cost differential
γ1.
We can now substitute (19) and (20) for ps and pL in (10) to obtain the equilibrium
location of the marginal consumer as a function of marginal production costs cs and cL:
x∗m
(
cs, cL
)
=

0
cL−cs
3(L+1)
+ 5L+7
12
L+ 1
if
if
if
cL ≤ cs − γ1(
cL − cs) ∈ (−γ1, γ2)
cL ≥ cs + γ2
. (21)
Again, three regimes are distinguished in (21), with the intuition behind these regimes
following from former discussions below (10) and (20). In the border line case of identical
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production costs, cs = cL, the marginal consumer is located at address xm = (5L+ 7)/12
and is, therefore, resident of the large economy. As a consequence, it is the small country
that exports the final good if production costs cs and cL are symmetric. This is the case
considered in Tharakan and Thisse [18], who emphasize the geographical disadvantage
of large economies. In our analysis, however, production costs cs and cL may differ
due to the existence of a local input producer in the large economy. Hence, from now
on we focus on the role of outsourcing opportunities in determining the location of the
marginal consumer. In particular, we show under which conditions there is international
outsourcing in equilibrium and how transport costs influence the price choice of the input
producer and thus the cost differential cL − cs in equilibrium.
Stage (iii) - Outsourcing decision: In analogy to the autarky scenario, the final goods
producer in country k = s, L chooses outsourcing, if ρk,d ≤ ci. Otherwise, production is
integrated. As a consequence, we have ck = min[ci, ρ
k,d].
Stage (ii) - Price setting of the input producer: The price choice of the input
producer clearly depends on whether she serves both final goods suppliers or only one of
the two competitors. By lowering the price vis-a`-vis one final goods producer, she makes
this firm more competitive, with positive effects on the respective output level. However,
with input sales to both final goods producers, such a discriminative price reduction
lowers the volume of input sales to the other final goods competitor. In this case, the
input producer cannibalizes her own market by setting a lower price vis-a`-vis one final
goods supplier. Of course, such a cannibalization effect cannot arise if the input producer
only serves one of the two final goods producers.
If the input supplier sets prices that render the two final goods producers indiffer-
ent between the two available production modes, i.e., if ρs,d = ρL,d = ci, the volume of
overall input sales is maximized and given by Ds +DL = L + 1.21 As a consequence, if
21In this case, the input price vis-a`-vis the final goods producer in country s is lower than the respective
price vis-a`-vis the final goods producer in country L, i.e., ρs < ρL, as the input producer is located at
the center of the large economy.
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the input supplier serves both final goods producers, she will not set prices lower than22
ci − t(L + 1)2/4 to avoid detrimental profit effects from cannibalizing her own market.
Furthermore, the input producer has an interest in intermediate goods exports only if
cu ≤ ci−t(L+1)2/4. Otherwise, serving the foreign final goods producer is associated with
negative operating profits. Accordingly, it is not profitable to serve the foreign final goods
producer in country s with intermediate goods from country L, if t > 4 (ci − cu) / (L+ 1)2
(no international outsourcing). On the contrary, if t ≤ 4 (ci − cu) / (L+ 1)2 intermediate
goods exports to country s are associated with non-negative operating profits, so that out-
sourcing becomes available to the final goods producer in the small economy (international
outsourcing). We investigate the high transport cost scenario first.
5.1 High transport costs – no international outsourcing
If t > 4(ci−cu)/(L+1)2, the input producer only serves the final goods producer in country
L and there is national but no international outsourcing after trade liberalization. In this
case, the operating profits of the input producer are given by23
χ =

(
ρL − cu
) [
(L+ 1)−
(
ρL−ci+γ1
3(L+1)
)]
(
ρL − cu
)
(L+ 1)
if
if
ρL ∈ [ci − γ1, ci]
ρL < ci − γ1
. (22)
If the input producer chooses a price below ci−γ1, the cost differential cs−cL is higher than
the critical level γ1 and the final goods producer of the large economy serves the whole
integrated market. On the contrary, if the input producer sets a price ρL ∈ [ci − γ1, ci],
the marginal consumer is located at address xm = (ρ
L − ci)/[3(L + 1)] + (5L + 7)/12,
according to (21), and input demand is determined by DL = L + 1 − xm, according to
22Recall that (L+ 1)/2 is the distance between the two market centers, so that ρs = ci − t(L+ 1)2/4
implies ρs,d = ci.
23Substituting ci = cs and ρL (≤ ci) = cL in (21) gives DL = L+ 1− x∗m
(
ci, ρ
L
)
> 0. This is used in
(22).
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Lemma 1. Maximizing the profits in (22) gives the following input price:
ρL∗ =

ci − γ1
ci+cu
2
+ (7L+5)(L+1)
8
ci
if
if
if
ci > ci
ci ∈
[
ci, ci
]
ci ∈
(
cu, ci
) , (23)
with ci := cu + (7L+ 5) (L+ 1) /4 and ci := cu + (17L+ 19) (L+ 1) /4. The profit-
maximizing input price ρL∗ depends on the cost differential ci − cu as well as the size of
market L, which determines the overall mass of consumers in the integrated market (as
the size of country s is normalized to one).24
The input producer faces the following trade-off, when setting the profit-maximizing
input price. On the one hand, a lower price reduces revenues for a given volume of sales
(revenue effect). On the other hand, it increases demand for intermediate goods (as
long as xm > 0 – output effect). To be more specific, from the discussion below eqs.
(19) and (20), we know that a decline in ρL = cL makes the final goods producer in
the large economy more competitive and provides an incentive for this producer to lower
the profit-maximizing mill price p∗L (direct effect). Since final goods prices are strategic
complements, p∗s falls as well (indirect effect). According to (19) and (20), it is the direct
effect that dominates and the price differential p∗L−p∗s falls if ρL declines, thereby, leading
to a lower x∗m, according to (10). The impact of an input price reduction on final goods
prices under free trade is graphically illustrated in Figure 3, where p1L (b) and p
1
s (b) refer
to an input price25 ρL = ci, whereas p
2
L (b) and p
2
s (b) refer to an input price ρ
L < ci.
>Figure 3<
The larger country L (and, thus, the larger its hinterland), the stronger is the revenue
effect, and the lower are, all other things equal, the incentives of the input producer for
a price reduction. Furthermore, the lower the cost differential ci − cu, the smaller is the
24The input price does not depend on transport cost parameter t, as long as intermediate goods exports
remain unattractive.
25Note that ρL = ci implies cs = cL = ci and, thus, p∗L > p
∗
s, according to (19) and (20). Furthermore,
the marginal consumer is located at address x∗m = (5L+ 7)/12 > 1 in this case (see (21)).
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scope for a decline in ρL. Thus, it is intuitive that the input producer sets ρL = ci and,
thereby, renders the final goods producer indifferent between the two available production
modes, if country L is large and the cost differential ci− cu is moderate. In this case, the
marginal consumer is located at address x∗m = (5L+ 7)/12 and, therefore, resident of the
large economy (see Figure 3 and Footnote 25). If, on the contrary, country L is small and
the cost differential is sizable, the input producer charges a low price. There is, however,
no incentive to choose an input price lower than ci − γ1, as the marginal consumer is
located at address xm = 0 and input sales reach their maximum level at ρ
L = ci − γ1.
For intermediate parameter values, ρL = (ci + cu) /2 + (7L+ 5) (L+ 1) /8 turns out to
be the profit-maximizing input price and the marginal consumer is located in interval
(0, (5L+ 7)/12), according to (21).
For the equilibrium trade pattern, the location of the marginal consumer (relative to
the common border) is decisive. It is therefore meaningful to determine the closed form
solution of x∗m(c
s, cL). For this purpose, we substitute ci = c
s and, from (23), ρL = cL in
(21). This gives
x∗m =

0
cu−ci
6(L+1)
+ 17L+19
24
5L+7
12
if
if
if
ci > ci
ci ∈
[
ci, ci
]
ci ∈
(
cu, ci
) . (24)
Whether the marginal consumer is resident of the large or the small economy depends on
the relative strength of two opposing forces (i.e., the following trade-off of being large),
namely the transport-cost-related size disadvantage26 and the outsourcing-related pro-
duction cost advantage of country L. The latter is induced by cu < ci.
27 If ci − cu >
(17L− 5) (L+ 1) /4, the outsourcing-related production cost advantage of the large coun-
try is dominant and the marginal consumer is located in the small economy, implying that
country L exports the final good. This case is depicted by the solid price-location sched-
26Recall that we speak of a transport-cost-related size disadvantage of the large economy, since country
L imports the final good at cs = cL.
27From Section 4, we know that the notion of a “cost advantage of outsourcing” refers to cheaper pro-
duction under outsourcing than under integrated production. This is a prerequisite for the “outsourcing-
related production cost advantage of country L” (over country s), which arises due to the existence of a
local input producer and the related domestic outsourcing opportunities in country L.
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ules in Figure 3. In contrast, the marginal consumer is located in L and the small country
exports the final good, if ci − cu < (17L− 5) (L+ 1) /4. In this case, the transport-cost-
related size disadvantage dominates the outsourcing-related production cost advantage of
country L. In the borderline case of ci−cu = (17L− 5) (L+ 1) /4, the marginal consumer
is located at the common border and there are no goods transactions across borders in
the free trade equilibrium (see (24)).
5.2 Low transport costs – international outsourcing
If transport costs for input transactions are sufficiently low, i.e., if t ≤ 4 (ci − cu) / (L+ 1)2,
the input producer earns non-negative operating profits from sales to the final goods pro-
ducer in country s, if she sets a price ρs ∈ [cu, ci − t (L+ 1)2 /4]. Moreover, recall that the
whole integrated market (L+1) can be served at input prices ρs = ρL = ci− t (L+ 1)2 /4
and that the input producer can avoid detrimental profit effects from cannibalizing her
own market, if she sets the two input prices not lower than ci − t(L+ 1)2/4. Hence, ρs <
ci−t (L+ 1)2 /4 and/or ρL < ci−t (L+ 1)2 /4 are not consistent with profit maximization
of the input producer. In view of stage (iii), this implies that the profit-maximizing input
price vis-a`-vis the final goods producer in country s is given by ρs∗ = ci − t (L+ 1)2 /4,
leading to ρs,d = ci. This renders the final goods producer in country s indifferent between
integrated production and international outsourcing. Profits of the input producer are
given by28
χ =

(
ρL − cu
)
(L+ 1)− (ρL − ρs) (ρL−ci+γ1
3(L+1)
)
(
ρL − cu
)
(L+ 1)
if
if
ρL ∈ [ci − γ1, ci]
ρL < ci − γ1
. (25)
The two regimes in (25) have the same interpretation as the respective regimes in (22),
because ρs∗ = ci − t(L+ 1)2/4 implies cs = ci.
Using ρs∗ = ci−t (L+ 1)2 /4 in the profit-maximization problem of the input producer
28Substituting ρs,d = cs = ci and ρL = cL ≤ ci in (21) gives Ds = x∗m
(
ci, ρ
L
) ≥ 0 and DL =
L+ 1− x∗m
(
ci, ρ
L
)
> 0. This is used in (25).
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gives the following price vis-a`-vis the final goods supplier in country L
ρL∗ =

ci − (5L+7)(L+1)4
ci − t (L+1)
2
8
+ (7L+5)(L+1)
8
ci
if
if
if
t > 17L+19
L+1
t ∈ [7L+5
L+1
, 17L+19
L+1
]
t < 7L+5
L+1
. (26)
Similar to the scenario without international outsourcing in Subsection 5.1, we can distin-
guish three input price regimes and we find that a greater market size of country L induces
lower incentives for a reduction of the input price vis-a`-vis the final goods producer in
country L. However, there is a key difference between eq. (23) and its counterpart in
(26). A reduction of ρL under international outsourcing raises input sales to the final
goods producer in the large economy but, at the same time, leads to a decline in the
input sales to the final goods producer in country s. This cannibalization effect induces
a decline in the operating profits from exports to country s and, therefore, reduces the
incentive for a price reduction vis-a`-vis the final goods supplier in country L. The strength
of this negative profit effect depends on the size of transport cost parameter t. The higher
t, the more expensive is the shipment of intermediate goods to country s and the more
attractive is, all other things equal, a price reduction vis-a`-vis the final goods producer in
country L.29, 30
Due to t > 0, there is again an outsourcing-related production cost advantage of
country L over country s, as the input producer can save on transport costs, when serving
the final goods supplier in L.31 Moreover, the final goods producer in country s cannot
participate in the cost advantage of outsourcing over integrated production, given the
profit-maximizing input price choice ρs∗ = ci − t (L+ 1)2 /4, which implies ρs,d = ci.
Things are different in the large economy, where the final goods producer can participate
29Due to (7L+ 5) / (L+ 1) > 1, it follows from (26) that ρL∗ = ci for all t ≤ 1. Hence, ρL∗ < ci requires
that transportation of intermediate goods induces higher costs than transportation of final output.
30A further difference between (23) and (26) is that the cost differential ci− cu is not a determinant of
the profit-maximizing input price ρL∗ under international outsourcing, as the input producer serves both
final goods competitors in this case. However, the cost differential is important for the attractiveness of
international outsourcing, because it is a key element of condition t ≤ 4(ci − cu)/(L+ 1)2.
31The final goods production costs include all costs that are necessary to manufacture final output.
Thus, they also include transport costs for intermediate goods transactions in case of international out-
sourcing.
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in the cost advantage of outsourcing, if ρL < ci. Finally, by maximizing her profits, the
input producer applies spatial price discrimination and sets ρL∗ > ρs∗. This is also an
immediate consequence of the positive transport costs for intermediate goods exports.
Substituting ci = ρ
s,d = cs and, according to (26), ρL∗ = cL in (21) gives the closed
form solution for the equilibrium location of the marginal consumer
x∗m =

0
17L+19
24
− tL+1
24
5L+7
12
if
if
if
t > 17L+19
L+1
t ∈ [7L+5
L+1
, 17L+19
L+1
]
t < 7L+5
L+1
. (27)
The interpretation of (27) is similar to that one of (24), with the mere difference, that the
three regimes depend on transport cost parameter t (but not on cost differential ci − cu)
if both final goods producers have access to the intermediate goods of the specialized
input supplier. The location of the marginal consumer again depends on two opposing
forces, namely the transport-cost-related size disadvantage and the outsourcing-related
production cost advantage of country L. Taking this trade-off of being large into account
gives the following result. If transport costs are sufficiently high32 and country L is
relatively small, i.e., if t > (17L− 5) / (L+ 1), the input producer sets price ρL low
enough, such that the marginal consumer is located in country s and country L exports
the final good. In this case, the outsourcing-related production cost advantage (in the
form of access to intermediate goods without transport costs) dominates the transport-
cost-related size disadvantage of the large economy. The opposite holds true, if t <
(17L− 5) / (L+ 1), i.e., if transport costs are moderate and country L is relatively large.
In this case, the marginal consumer is located in country L and country s exports the
final good.33 In the borderline case of t = (17L− 5) / (L+ 1), the marginal consumer is
located at the common border and trade in final goods does not occur. However, there
32Recall that a parameter domain with t ≤ 4 (ci − cu) / (L+ 1)2 has been considered.
33If the marginal consumer is located in the large economy and t ≤ 4(ci−cu)/(L+1)2, our model gives
rise to two-way vertical trade, with the large economy exporting the intermediate good to and importing
the final good from the smaller trading partner. This outcome is notable as vertical transactions have
been put forward in a recent article by Yi [20] as a key phenomenon of the globalization process after
World War II.
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are intermediate goods exports of the large economy, i.e., international outsourcing of the
final goods producer in country s.
The main findings for the two different scenarios analyzed in Subsections 5.1 and 5.2
are summarized in Proposition 2 .
Proposition 2 Under Assumption 2, if there is a single input supplier located in country
L, the following holds. In the free trade equilibrium there is international outsourcing
of the final goods producer in country s, if transport costs for input transactions are not
too high, i.e., if t ≤ 4 (ci − cu) / (L+ 1)2. In contrast, if t > 4 (ci − cu) / (L+ 1)2 there is
integrated production in country s and no international outsourcing. In both cases, country
L exports the final good, if the outsourcing-related production cost advantage dominates
the transport-cost-related size disadvantage of the large economy. Otherwise, country s
exports the final good.
Proof. Proposition 2 follows from the analysis above.
To conclude this section, we can compare our findings with previous insights on the role
of trade liberalization for the structure of industrial production. If there is international
outsourcing in the free trade equilibrium, the input producer serves the whole integrated
market in our model. In this case, our results are in line with the finding of McLaren [13]
that lower trade barriers lead to leaner and less integrated firms.34 However, if the size of
transport costs for shipping intermediate goods precludes international outsourcing and
the small country exports the final good after market integration, there is a decline in
the outsourcing activities. This outcome makes clear that increased competition between
final goods producers in the open economy may trigger adverse effects on the structure
of industrial production from an integrated point of view.
34In McLaren [13], trade liberalization thickens the market of intermediate goods and, thereby, raises
the outside option of input producers. This alleviates the hold-up problem and reduces the incentives
for vertical integration. Hence, the mechanism leading to increased outsourcing in McLaren [13] differs
substantially from the one put forward in our analysis, where a hold-up problem does not arise (see
Footnote 7).
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6 The welfare effects of trade liberalization
In Section 5 we have investigated how trade liberalization affects the price-setting behavior
of the single intermediate goods producer as well as the two final goods competitors. This
has shed new light on the trade pattern between two asymmetrically sized economies and
the consequences of market integration for the structure of industrial production. The
results of the above analysis are now used to investigate in which way trade patterns and
outsourcing opportunities govern the welfare effects of trade liberalization. The sum of
consumer surplus and profits serves as our welfare measure.
It is an immediate consequence of Assumption 2 and the induced pro-competitive effect
of trade liberalization on final goods prices that consumers in both economies benefit
from economic integration.35 Moreover, it can be shown that welfare in the final goods
exporting country always increases. The pro-competitive effect of trade liberalization leads
to a price reduction in both economies and, therefore, to lower profits from local sales.
However, in the final goods exporting country these profit losses are fully compensated
by consumer surplus gains. In addition to this welfare-neutral redistribution effect, there
are profit gains from final goods sales in the foreign economy, leading to a positive welfare
effect in the final goods exporting country. This outcome is independent of the production
techniques used in the two economies.
However, for determining the winners and losers of trade liberalization in a setting
as ours it is not only relevant which one of the two economies exports/imports the final
good. If there is an outsourcing-related production cost advantage of the large economy,
then both countries may simultaneously gain from trade liberalization. On the one hand,
if ρL is chosen low enough and country L exports the final output, consumers in the
small economy can participate in the cost advantage of outsourcing and consumer surplus
gains may dominate profit losses in country s. Hence, welfare in country s may increase,
even if it imports the final good. On the other hand, in case of international outsourcing
the large economy benefits from intermediate goods exports so that welfare in country L
35This is a mere price effect, since Assumptions 1 and 2 guarantee full coverage under autarky and free
trade.
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may increase, even if it imports the final good (and profit losses of the local final goods
producer dominate the consumer surplus gains in the large economy).
Table 1 summarizes the welfare effects of trade liberalization.36 Two results are par-
ticularly notable. First, both the small and the large country can simultaneously benefit
from reducing trade barriers (scenarios (iii), (iv) and (vi)). This renders an agreement on
bilateral trade liberalization (and the formation of a free trade area) feasible, even if there
are no measures of cross-country redistribution. The existence of gains from trade in all
involved economies is a result that is well-known from the traditional trade literature.
However, the positive effects of free trade are less clear in new trade theory models with
imperfect competition in goods markets. Wong [19] gives an excellent overview on the
gains from trade for economies under market imperfections.
TABLE 1. Welfare effects of trade liberalization if only in country L there is specialized
input production
Final goods ex- Welfare effects Welfare effects World welfare
porting country in country s in country L effects
No international outsourcing, i.e., t > 4 ci−cu
(L+1)2
(i) ci − cu < (17L−5)(L+1)4 country s + − amb.
(ii) ci − cu = (17L−5)(L+1)4 no final goods trade 0 0 0
(iii) ci − cu > (17L−5)(L+1)4 country L amb. + +
International outsourcing from s to L, i.e., t < 4 ci−cu
(L+1)2
(iv) t < 17L−5L+1 country s + amb. amb.
(v) t = 17L−5L+1 no final goods trade 0 + +
(vi) t > 17L−5L+1 country L amb. + +
Notes: In this matrix, “+”, “−”, and “0” mean that trade liberalization has a positive, negative or no
effect on the respective welfare levels. “amb.” indicates that the impact is ambiguous.
36A formal proof of the results in Table 1 is relegated to Appendix B.
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As far as spatial models are concerned, Tharakan and Thisse [18] investigate the impact
of the geographical size of countries on the distribution of welfare gains. In their final
goods trade model, “large countries, unlike small ones, should be less inclined towards free
trade” (p. 399), since their welfare decreases in response to trade liberalization. There,
the welfare effects are determined by the transport-cost-related size disadvantage of the
large economy, while the possibility of an outsourcing-related production cost advantage
is not accounted for.37
Second, our analysis also points to the possibility that trade liberalization reduces
overall world welfare, if final goods exports of s (partially) substitute local sales in L
that are manufactured either under a superior production mode or at a lower cost due to
savings on transport costs for intermediate goods transactions (scenarios (i) and (iv) in
Table 1). Thus, trade liberalization is not always beneficial but may exert immiserizing
effects from an integrated point of view. Note that focusing on the pro-competitive effects
of trade liberalization, such detrimental welfare consequences can only arise if different
technologies are used by the two final goods producers under autarky, which itself is
explained by market size asymmetries in our analysis.
7 Concluding remarks
This paper develops a theory of outsourcing and trade in a spatial model a` la Hotelling,
where countries are treated as areas rather than points. By emphasizing the role of out-
sourcing opportunities, our analysis is able to identify a trade-off of being large. On the one
hand, firms in geographically large economies face a transport-cost-related disadvantage
with respect to serving consumers close to borders. On the other hand, if geographically
large economies are population-rich, they have an outsourcing-related production cost
advantage due to a higher degree of vertical specialization.
37Tharakan [17] shows in a Hotelling model that both the geographical sizes and the population densities
of countries are important determinants of the welfare effects of trade liberalization. Behrens et al. [3]
discuss the welfare effects of reductions in both international trade barriers as well as national/regional
transport costs.
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In this setting, we investigate trade liberalization between two asymmetrically sized
economies. In particular, we identify the main economic fundamentals which determine
the pattern of final goods trade and we show how market integration, by changing the
competitive environment in the final goods sector, affects the structure of industrial pro-
duction. Thereby, our analysis emphasizes the role of national transport costs at the final
and intermediate goods level and it provides novel insights into how the transport-cost-
related disadvantage of large economies interacts with their outsourcing-related produc-
tion cost advantage in determining the free trade equilibrium.
Also the welfare effects of trade liberalization are considered. In this respect, our
results point to the relevance of outsourcing opportunities in making trade liberalization
a success story in differently sized economies. This provides an economic reasoning for
the willingness of countries to eliminate trade barriers and to enter a free trade agreement
with partner countries that differ in size and economic capacity. However, it cannot be
ruled out in general that at least one country is worse off after a movement from autarky
to free trade. In this case, the world as a whole may lose from trade liberalization, even if
pro-competitive effects lead to lower consumer prices. Detrimental consequences for world
welfare may arise if there is a decline of domestic outsourcing, due to market share losses
of the final goods producer in the large economy. This is the case if the transport-cost-
related disadvantage of being large dominates the outsourcing-related production cost
advantage.
Appendix
Appendix A: Proof of Lemma 1
Consider A > ci + L (5L+ 4) /4, according to Assumption 2, and use c
s ≤ ci, cL ≤ ci.
The proof is organized in two steps:
Step (i): Price-setting and interior solutions (with Ds > 0, DL > 0)
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Consider first price-setting in country s. Use38
pis =
 (ps − cs)xm (ps, pL)(ps − cs) [min (v, xm)− w]
if
if
ps ≤ pas
ps > p
a
s
, (28)
according to (10), (11), (13) and (15). Moreover, define D1s := (pL − ps) / (L+ 1) +
(L+ 3) /4 (= xm), D
2
s := (pL − ps) / (L+ 1) + (L+ 1) /4 +
√
A− ps (= xm − w) and
D3s := v − w = 2
√
A− ps, according to (10) and (11). Substituting D1s , D2s and D3s for
Ds in (15) gives
φ1s : = (ps − cs)
(
pL − ps
L+ 1
+
L+ 3
4
)
, (29)
φ2s : = (ps − cs)
(
pL − ps
L+ 1
+
L+ 1
4
+
√
A− ps
)
, (30)
φ3s : = (ps − cs) 2
√
A− ps, (31)
respectively. Profits pis are continuous in ps and can be written as a composite of φ
1
s, φ
2
s
and φ3s, according to (28)-(31). (Hence, the properties of φ
j
s translate into the properties
of pis.) The first derivatives of (29)-(31) with respect to ps are given by
∂φ1s
∂ps
=
pL − ps
L+ 1
+
L+ 3
4
− (ps − c
s)
L+ 1
, (32)
∂φ2s
∂ps
=
pL − ps
L+ 1
+
L+ 1
4
+
√
A− ps − (ps − c
s)
L+ 1
(
1 +
1
2
L+ 1√
A− ps
)
, (33)
∂φ3s
∂ps
= 2
√
A− ps − ps − c
s
√
A− ps
. (34)
Evaluating (32)-(34) at autarky prices pas = A− 1/4, paL = A− L2/4 gives
∂φ1s
∂ps
∣∣∣∣
(pas ,paL)
=
cs + L+ 5/4− A
L+ 1
, (35)
∂φ2s
∂ps
∣∣∣∣
(pas ,paL)
=
L+ 1− (L+ 2) (A− cs − 1/4)
L+ 1
, (36)
∂φ3s
∂ps
∣∣∣∣
(pas ,paL)
= 2cs + 3/2− 2A. (37)
38Note that v < xm(ps, pL) is in principle also possible if ps ≤ pas . This, however, would require
pL > p
a
L, which – as outlined below – is not consistent with Assumption 2 and ps ≤ pas . Hence, to present
the proof of Lemma 1 in a concise way, we can safely ignore the possibility of v < xm(ps, pL) in the first
line of eq. (28). See our formal results below.
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In view of (35)-(37), it can be shown that, for any cs ≤ ci, A > ci + L (5L+ 4) /4 is
sufficient for ∂φjs/∂ps|(pas ,paL) < 0, j = 1, 2, 3. Due to ∂
2φjs/∂ (p
j
s)
2
< 0, ∂2φjs/∂ps∂pL ≥ 0
and the fact that pis is a continuous function in ps (see (28)), it follows that pL ≤ paL and
Ds > 0 are only consistent with a free trade equilibrium, if ps < p
a
s . (Existence of such
an equilibrium will be discussed below.)
Now consider price-setting in country L. Use
piL =

(
pL − cL
)
[L+ 1− xm (ps, pL)](
pL − cL
)
[y −max (z, xm)]
if
if
pL ≤ paL
pL > p
a
L
, (38)
according to (10), (12), (14) and (16). Moreover, defineD1L := (3L+ 1) /4−(pL − ps) / (L+ 1)
(= L + 1 − xm), D2L := (L+ 1) /4 − (pL − ps) / (L+ 1) +
√
A− pL (= y − xm) and
D3L := y − z = 2
√
A− pL, according to (10) and (12). Substituting D1L, D2L and D3L for
DL in (16) gives
φ1L : =
(
pL − cL
)(3L+ 1
4
− pL − ps
L+ 1
)
, (39)
φ2L : =
(
pL − cL
)(L+ 1
4
− pL − ps
L+ 1
+
√
A− pL
)
, (40)
φ3L : =
(
pL − cL
)
2
√
A− pL, (41)
respectively. Profits piL are continuous in pL and can be written as a composite of φ
1
L, φ
2
L
and φ3L, according to (38)-(41). (Hence, the properties of φ
j
L translate into the properties
of piL.) The first derivatives of (39)-(41) with respect to pL are given by
∂φ1L
∂pL
=
ps − pL
L+ 1
+
3L+ 1
4
− pL − c
L
L+ 1
, (42)
∂φ2L
∂pL
=
ps − pL
L+ 1
+
L+ 1
4
+
√
A− pL − pL − c
L
L+ 1
(
1 +
1
2
L+ 1√
A− pL
)
, (43)
∂φ3L
∂pL
= 2
√
A− pL − pL − c
L
√
A− pL
. (44)
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Evaluating (42)-(44) at autarky prices pas = A− 1/4, paL = A− L2/4 gives
∂φ1L
∂pL
∣∣∣∣
(pas ,paL)
=
cL + 5L2/4 + L− A
L+ 1
, (45)
∂φ2L
∂pL
∣∣∣∣
(pas ,paL)
=
L3 + L2 − (2L+ 1) (A− L2/4− cL)
L2 + L
, (46)
∂φ2L
∂pL
∣∣∣∣
(pas ,paL)
=
2cL + 3L2/2− 2A
L
. (47)
According to (45)-(47), it follows that, for any cL ≤ ci, A > ci+L (5L+ 4) /4 is sufficient
for ∂φjL/∂pL
∣∣
(pas ,paL)
< 0, j = 1, 2, 3. Due to ∂2φjL/∂
(
pjL
)2
< 0, ∂2φjL/∂pL∂ps ≥ 0 and the
fact that piL is a continuous function in pL (see (38)), it can be deduced that ps ≤ pas and
DL > 0 are only consistent with a free trade equilibrium if pL < p
a
L.
Finally, note that ps > p
a
s and pL > p
a
L cannot simultaneously hold in the free trade
equilibrium, if pas and p
a
L are profit-maximizing prices under autarky. Then, an interior
solution with Ds > 0 and DL > 0 is only consistent with profit maximization by the two
final goods producers, if pL < p
a
L and ps < p
a
s simultaneously hold in equilibrium. This
follows from the analysis above. In such an equilibrium, prices are given by39
ps =
cL + 2cs
3
+
(5L+ 7) (L+ 1)
12
, (48)
pL =
2cL + cs
3
+
(7L+ 5) (L+ 1)
12
. (49)
(These prices are obtained by setting (32) and (42) equal to zero. The second-order
conditions for profit maxima are fulfilled, due to ∂2φ1s/∂p
2
s < 0 and ∂
2φ1L/∂p
2
L < 0.) Using
(48) and (49) in (10)-(14) gives
Ds = xm =
cL − cs
3 (L+ 1)
+
5L+ 7
12
, (50)
DL = L+ 1− xm = c
s − cL
3 (L+ 1)
+
7L+ 5
12
(51)
so that an interior solution with Ds > 0 and DL > 0 requires(
cL − cs) ∈ (−(5L+ 7) (L+ 1)
4
,
(7L+ 5) (L+ 1)
4
)
. (52)
39ps < p
a
s = A − 1/4 and pL < paL = A − L2/4 can be shown by using cs ≤ ci and cL ≤ ci together
with A > ci + L (5L+ 4) /4.
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Step (ii): Price setting and corner solutions (with Ds = 0 or DL = 0)
40
An interior solution with Ds > 0 is not compatible with profit maximization by the two
final goods producers, according to (50), if cL ≤ cs−(5L+ 7) (L+ 1) /4. In this case, equi-
librium prices fulfill41 pL = ps− (L+ 3) (L+ 1) /4 and ps ≤ cs, so that xm = 0, according
to (10), and, therefore, DL = L+ 1, Ds = 0. In contrast, if c
L ≥ cs + (7L+ 5) (L+ 1) /4,
an interior solution with DL > 0 is not compatible with profit maximization by the
two final goods producers, according to (51). In this case, equilibrium prices fulfill
ps = pL − (3L+ 1) (L+ 1) /4 and pL ≤ cL, so that xm = L + 1, according to (10),
and, therefore, Ds = xm = L+ 1, DL = 0.
In view of steps (i) and (ii) the following holds in the free trade equilibrium (if A >
ci + L(5L + 4)/4 and c
k ≤ ci, k = s, L). Demand for final output produced in the
two countries is given by Ds = xm and DL = L + 1 − xm, respectively, so that Ds +
DL = L + 1. Together with (15) and (16) this implies pis = (ps − cs)xm (ps, pL) and
piL =
(
pL − cL
)
(L+ 1− xm (ps, pL)) and, therefore, establishes Lemma 1. 
Appendix B: Formal derivation of the welfare effects of trade
liberalization
Assumption 2 is considered throughout Appendix B.
40Note that an outcome with 0 < z < w is inconsistent with profit-maximization of the final goods
producer in country s, while an outcome with L+ 1 > v > y is inconsistent with profit-maximization of
the final goods producer in country L. Hence, these two cases – which are related to the second lines in
eqs. (13) and (14) – can safely be ignored in the following analysis and a corner solution is only possible
if either xm = 0 or xm = L+ 1.
41Although the final goods producer in country s is indifferent between all ps ≥ cs if Ds = 0, prices
ps > c
s are not consistent with best responses of the two competitors in the final goods market. Moreover,
the price equilibrium is not unique if cL < cs − (5L+ 7) (L+ 1) /4. In this case, not only ps = cs but
also some ps < cs are consistent with an equilibrium.
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No international outsourcing: t > 4 (ci − cu) / (L+ 1)2
The proof is organized in three parts.
Part (i): Consider ci − cu < (17L− 5) (L+ 1) /4. Then, x∗m > 1 follows, according to
(24). The welfare change in the small economy is given by ∆Ws =
∫ x∗m
1
[p∗s − ci] db > 0
and welfare changes in L are given by
∆WL =
∫ x∗m
1
[paL (b)− p∗s (b)] db−
∫ x∗m
1
[paL − cu] db, (53)
where paL (b) = p
a
L+[b− (1 + L/2)]2 and p∗s (b) = p∗s+[b− 1/2]2. paL = A−L2/4, according
to Proposition 1. Moreover, substituting ci = c
s and, according to (23), ρL∗ = cL in (19)
gives
p∗s =
 5ci+cu6 +
(17L+19)(L+1)
24
ci +
(5L+7)(L+1)
12
if
if
ci ∈
[
ci, c˜i
)
ci ∈
(
cu,ci
) , (54)
where ci = cu+(7L+ 5) (L+ 1) /4, according to (23), and c˜i := cu+(17L− 5) (L+ 1) /4
are used. Thus, (53) can be rewritten as
∆WL =
∫ x∗m
1
[
[b− (1 + L/2)]2 − [b− 1/2]2] db− ∫ x∗m
1
(5L+ 7) (L+ 1)
12
db−∆Ψ2, (55)
where
∆Ψ2 :=

∫ x∗m
1
[
5
6
(ci − cu) + (7L+5)(L+1)24
]
db∫ x∗m
1
(ci − cu) db
if
if
ci ∈
[
ci, c˜i
)
ci ∈
(
cu,ci
) . (56)
Using x∗m, according to (24), and substituting (56) into (55) gives
∆WL =
 − (x
∗
m − 1)
[
(13L+15)(L+1)
16
+ 3(ci−cu)
4
]
− (x∗m − 1)
[
(3L+5)(L+1)
8
+ (ci − cu)
] if
if
ci ∈
[
ci, c˜i
)
ci ∈
(
cu,ci
) , (57)
and, therefore, ∆WL < 0. Finally, ∆W = ∆WL +∆Ws implies
∆W =
∫ x∗m
1
[
[b− (1 + L/2)]2 − [b− 1/2]2] db− ∫ x∗m
1
(ci − cu) db
=
 − (x
∗
m − 1)
[
11(ci−cu)
12
+ (5L+7)(L+1)
48
]
(x∗m − 1)
[
L2−1
24
− (ci − cu)
] if
if
ci ∈
[
ci, c˜i
)
ci ∈
(
cu, ci
) . (58)
Since ci − cu < (L− 1) (L+ 1) /24 implies ci < ci, it is straightforward to show that
∆W >,=, < 0 if ci − cu <,=, > (L− 1) (L+ 1) /24.
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Part (ii): If ci − cu = (17L− 5) (L+ 1) /4, then the marginal consumer is located at
x∗m = 1, according to (24), so that welfare in both economies and, therefore, also overall
world welfare are unaffected by free trade, i.e., ∆W = ∆Wk = 0, k = s, L.
Part (iii): Consider ci − cu > (17L− 5) (L+ 1) /4. Then, x∗m < 1 holds, according to
(24), so that trade liberalization leads to a welfare gain in the large economy, which is
given by ∆WL =
∫ 1
x∗m
[p∗L − cu] db > 0. Welfare changes in s are given by
∆Ws =
∫ 1
x∗m
[pas (b)− p∗L (b)] db−
∫ 1
x∗m
[pas − ci] db, (59)
where pas (b) = p
a
s + [b− 1/2]2 and p∗L (b) = p∗L+ [b− (1 + L/2)]2. pas = A− 1/4, according
to Proposition 1. Moreover, substituting ci = c
s and, according to (23), ρL∗ = cL in (20)
gives
p∗L =
 ci −
(L+3)(L+1)
4
2ci+cu
3
+ (7L+5)(L+1)
6
if
if
ci > ci
ci ∈ (c˜i, ci]
, (60)
where ci = cu+(17L+ 19) (L+ 1) /4, according to (23), and c˜i = cu+(17L− 5) (L+ 1) /4
are used. Hence, (59) can be transformed into
∆Ws =
∫ 1
x∗m
[
[b− 1/2]2 − [b− (1 + L/2)]2] db− ∫ 1
x∗m
(7L+ 5) (L+ 1)
12
db+∆Ψ3, (61)
where
∆Ψ3 :=

∫ 1
x∗m
(5L+7)(L+1)
6
db∫ 1
x∗m
[
ci−cu
3
− (7L+5)(L+1)
12
]
db
if
if
ci > ci
ci ∈ (c˜i, ci]
. (62)
Using x∗m, according to (24), and substituting (62) in (61) implies
∆Ws =

L+1
2
(1− x∗m)
[
(ci−cu)
4
− (17L+11)(L+1)
16
] if
if
ci > ci
ci ∈ (c˜i, ci]
. (63)
From (63) it is obvious that ∆Ws >,=, < 0 if ci − cu >,=, < (17L+ 11) (L+ 1) /4.
(Remember that ci − cu > (17L− 5) (L+ 1) /4 holds.) Finally, ∆W = ∆Ws + ∆WL is
given by
∆W =
∫ 1
x∗m
[
[b− 1/2]2 − [b− (1 + L/2)]2] db+ ∫ 1
x∗m
(ci − cu) db
=
 (ci − cu)−
(L+1)2
4
(1− x∗m)
[
11(ci−cu)
12
+ (5L+7)(L+1)
48
] if
if
ci > ci
ci ∈ (c˜i, ci]
, (64)
37
with x∗m < 1 and, therefore, ∆W > 0. This completes the proof. 
International outsourcing: t ≤ 4 (ci − cu) / (L+ 1)2
The proof is organized in three parts.
Part (i): Consider t < (17L − 5)/(L + 1). Then, x∗m > 1 holds, according to (27), so
that trade liberalization leads to ∆Ws =
∫ x∗m
1
[p∗s − ci] db > 0. Thereby, ρs,d = ci has been
used. Welfare changes in L are given by
∆WL =
∫ x∗m
1
[paL (b)− p∗s (b)] db−
∫ x∗m
1
[paL − ρs∗] db+
∫ 1
0
[ρs∗ − cu] db, (65)
where paL (b) = p
a
L + [b− (1 + L/2)]2, p∗s (b) = p∗s + [b− 1/2]2, ρs∗ = ci − t(L + 1)2/4 and
paL = A − L2/4. Substituting ci = ρs,d = cs and, according to (26), ρL∗ = cL in (19)
implies
p∗s =
 ci − t
(L+1)2
24
+ (17L+19)(L+1)
24
ci +
(5L+7)(L+1)
12
if
if
t ∈ B1
t ∈ B2
, (66)
with B1 :=
[
7L+5
L+1
, 17L−5
L+1
)
and B2 :=
(
0, 7L+5
L+1
)
. Note that (65) accounts for the fact that
trade liberalization leads to operating profits in the amount of
∫ x∗m
0
[ρs∗ − cu] db from inter-
mediate goods exports to the final goods producer located in country s. Straightforward
calculations imply
∆WL =
∫ x∗m
1
[
[b− (1 + L/2)]2 − [b− 1/2]2] db− ∫ x∗m
1
(5L+ 7) (L+ 1)
12
db−∆Ψ4, (67)
according to (65). Thereby,
∆Ψ4 :=

∫ x∗m
1
[
(7L+5)(L+1)
24
+ 5t (L+1)
2
24
]
db− (ci − cu) + t
(
L+1
2
)2∫ x∗m
1
t
(
L+1
2
)2
db− (ci − cu) + t
(
L+1
2
)2 if
if
t ∈ B1
t ∈ B2
(68)
has been considered. Using x∗m, according to (27), and substituting (68) in (67) gives
∆WL =
 − (x
∗
m − 1)
[
(13L+15)(L+1)
16
+ 3t (L+1)
2
16
]
+ (ci − cu)− t
(
L+1
2
)2
− (x∗m − 1)
[
[(3L+5)](L+1)
8
+ t
(
L+1
2
)2]
+ (ci − cu)− t
(
L+1
2
)2 if
if
t ∈ B1
t ∈ B2
.
(69)
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Since t ≤ 4 (ci − cu) / (L+ 1)2, it is straightforward to conclude that the sign of ∆WL is
ambiguous. Using ∆W = ∆Ws +∆WL implies
∆W =
∫ x∗m
1
[
[b− (1 + L/2)]2 − [b− 1/2]2] db− ∫ x∗m
1
(ci − ρs,∗) db+
∫ 1
0
[ρs,∗ − cu] db
=
 − (x
∗
m − 1)
[
(5L+7)(L+1)
48
+ 11t (L+1)
2
48
]
+ (ci − cu)− t
(
L+1
2
)2
(x∗m − 1)
[
(L−1)(L+1)
24
− t (L+1
2
)2]
+ (ci − cu)− t
(
L+1
2
)2 if
if
t ∈ B1
t ∈ B2
.(70)
From (70) it is obvious that the sign of ∆W is ambiguous. However, t < (L− 1) / [6 (L+ 1)]
is sufficient for ∆W > 0.42 Thereby, (L− 1) / [6 (L+ 1)] < (7L+ 5) / (L+ 1) has been
considered.
Part (ii): Note that there is no trade of the final good, if t = (17L− 5) / (L+ 1),
according to (27). Thus, ρs,d = ρs∗ + t (L+ 1)2 /4 = ci implies that welfare in country s
is not affected by trade liberalization. Due to exports of the intermediate good, welfare
changes in L are given by ∆WL =
∫ 1
0
[ρs∗ − cu] db, which are strictly positive if t <
4 (ci − cu) / (L+ 1)2. In contrast, welfare in L is unchanged, if t = 4 (ci − cu) / (L+ 1)2.
Overall world welfare changes are determined by welfare changes in L, i.e., ∆W = ∆WL,
since ∆Ws = 0.
Part (iii): Consider t > (17L − 5)/(L + 1). Then, x∗m < 1 holds, according to (27),
so that trade liberalization leads to a welfare gain in country L that is given by ∆WL =∫ 1
x∗m
[p∗L − cu] db +
∫ x∗m
0
[ρs∗ − cu] db > 0. Thereby,
∫ x∗m
0
[ρs∗ − cu] db are operating profits
associated with intermediate goods exports to country s. Use ρs,d = ci . Then, welfare
changes in country s are given by
∆Ws =
∫ 1
x∗m
[pas (b)− p∗L (b)] db−
∫ 1
x∗m
[pas − ci] db, (71)
where pas (b) = p
a
s + [b− 1/2]2 and p∗L (b) = p∗L+ [b− (1 + L/2)]2. pas = A− 1/4, according
to Proposition 1. Moreover, substituting ci = ρ
s,d = cs and, according to (26), ρL∗ = cL
in (20) gives
p∗L =
 ci −
(L+3)(L+1)
4
ci − t (L+1)
2
12
+ (7L+5)(L+1)
6
if
if
t > 17L+19
L+1
t ∈ B3
, (72)
42Moreover, t > (L− 1)/[6(L+ 1)] and t = 4(ci − cu)/(L+ 1)2 are sufficient for ∆W < 0.
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with B3 :=
(
17L−5
L+1
, 17L+19
L+1
]
. (71) can be rewritten as
∆Ws =
∫ 1
x∗m
[
[b− 1/2]2 − [b− (1 + L/2)]2] db− ∫ 1
x∗m
(7L+ 5) (L+ 1)
12
db−∆Ψ5. (73)
Thereby,
∆Ψ5 :=
 −
∫ 1
x∗m
(5L+7)(L+1)
6
db∫ 1
x∗m
[
(7L+5)(L+1)
12
− t (L+1)2
12
]
db
if
if
t > 17L+19
L+1
t ∈ B3
(74)
has been used. In view of (27), (73) and (74), one obtains
∆Ws =

L+1
2
− (1− x∗m)
[
(17L+11)(L+1)
16
− t (L+1)2
16
] if
if
t > 17L+19
L+1
t ∈ B3
. (75)
Thus, ∆Ws >,=, < 0 if t >,=, < (17L+ 11) / (L+ 1). (Remember that t > (17L− 5) / (L+ 1)
holds.) Finally, using ∆W = ∆Ws +∆WL gives
∆W =
∫ 1
x∗m
[
[b− 1/2]2 − [b− (1 + L/2)]2] db+ ∫ 1
x∗m
(ci − cu) db+
∫ x∗m
0
[ρs,∗ − cu] db
=

(ci − cu)−
(
L+1
2
)2
(1− x∗m)
[
(5L+7)(L+1)
48
+ (ci − cu)− t (L+1)
2
48
+ x
∗
m
1−x∗m
(
(ci − cu)− t
(
L+1
2
)2)]
if
if
t > 17L+19
L+1
t ∈ B3
. (76)
Thereby, ∆W > 0 holds since ci − cu ≥ t (L+ 1)2 /4 and t (> (17L− 5) / (L+ 1)) > 1.
This completes the proof. 
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Figure 2. Autarky equilibrium in two asymmetrically sized economies 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Free final goods trade with *L icρ =  (dashed curves) and *L icρ <  (solid curves) 
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